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P B M I REVISITING HOOPER
MAX MINZNER*
In Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,' the Supreme Court invalidated the
New Mexico state property tax exemption for Vietnam veterans residing in New
Mexico. My mother wrote the lower court opinion 2 reversed by the U.S. Supreme
Court. I was eleven when the case came down, and it was the first Supreme Court
case of which I was ever aware. I barely understood what had happened, but I knew
the U.S. Supreme Court had concluded that my mother made a mistake in one of her
earliest decisions as a judge on the New Mexico Court of Appeals. That frustrated
me. Hooper was the first case I looked up when I learned how to use a law library.
It frustrated me even more once I read it. On the face of the opinion, it appeared that
my mother had approved of a state law that was both irrational and illegitimate.
That hardly sounded like the kind of judge I believed her to be. I watched her put
a tremendous amount of time and effort into her decisions, and I knew how careful
and conscientious she was about her work. The Supreme Court's decision in
Hooper seemed like it had to be wrong.
Hooper is an exceptional case in many ways. First, the case is infused with the
right to travel-a constitutional right with a long pedigree but little textual support.
Additionally, it is one of the few opinions in which the Supreme Court struck down
a statute on rational basis review. 3 Finally, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
upheld the statute unanimously4 and the New Mexico Supreme Court denied
certiorari; 5 yet the U.S. Supreme Court took the case and reversed. 6 I am aware of
only one other case since New Mexico established an intermediate appellate court
where the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a decision that the New Mexico Supreme
Court declined to hear.7
For this Special Issue of the New Mexico Law Review, I thought I would return
to Hooperand try to determine whether my frustration with the Supreme Court was
justified. Was this a case my mother and her colleagues could have gotten right?
Could she have prevented reversal? In the end, based on the case law presented to
her, I believe that reversal was inevitable. The Court's process in Hooper was very
unusual. While it claimed to be applying rational basis review, it was in fact
engaging in a form of heightened scrutiny, holding provisions like the one in
Hooper to a higher standard.8 At the time of Hooper, the Court was in the process
* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School ofLaw, Yeshiva University. The author would
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and suggestions and the staff of the Manuscript Room of the Library of Congress for their help with the Blackmun
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1. 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
2. Hooper v. Bemaillo County Assessor, 101 N.M. 172, 679 P.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1984).
3. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481,513 n.120 (2004); Robert
C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Courtfrom the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans,
32 IND. L. REV. 357, 370 (1999).
4. Hooper, 101 N.M. 172, 679 P.2d 840.
5. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 101 N.M. 77, 678 P.2d 705 (1984).
6. Hooper, 472 U.S. 612.
7. See Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832 (1982), rev'g 95 N.M.
708, 625 P.2d 1225 (Ct. App. 1980); see also Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989)
(affirming a decision of the New Mexico intermediate appellate court after the New Mexico Supreme Court initially
granted, and then quashed, a writ of certiorari).
8. Other authors have also noted that Hooper,and its predecessor, Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982),
are, at best, a very strange application of rational basis review. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy:
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of reinvigorating the right to travel in a way impossible to predict when the New
Mexico Court of Appeals heard the case.
Part I of this article provides the background to the New Mexico Court of
Appeals' and U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Hooper. The case law prior to
Hooper clearly indicated that rational basis review applied to this type of right-totravel challenge. The New Mexico Court of Appeals found the statute constitutional
on a rational basis standard. Even though the Supreme Court had previously
approved of veterans' benefits of the type provided by the State of New Mexico on
the theory that states could reward veterans for past service, it abandoned this
precedent and reversed in Hooper.The Court applied the reasoning from Zobel v.
Williams, a new case barring states from rewarding residents for their prior service
to the state.
Part II analyzes the reasoning in Hooper and Zobel. While the Court purported
to apply rational basis review in both cases, I argue that the reasoning of both
opinions is more consistent with strict scrutiny. Additionally, sources in the
Blackmun Archives support this conclusion by revealing the drafting history of
Zobel. Zobel was initially written as a heightened scrutiny case and the logic of
heightened scrutiny persisted into the opinion eventually issued by the Court.
Part RI considers the post-Hooperright-to-travel landscape. The Supreme Court
no longer claims that rational basis review applies to these types of challenges and
has adopted explicitly the implicit holding of Hooper and Zobel that strict scrutiny
is appropriate in these cases. The New Mexico Court of Appeals' decision in
Hooper, while correct at the time, fell victim to a shift in the law that the Supreme
Court only acknowledged much later.
I.
At the time Hooper was decided, New Mexico had a long history of providing
property tax exemptions for veterans.9 Veterans of each major conflict were eligible
if they established residency within a fixed period of time after the conflict ended.' 0

Does the Privilegesor Immunities Revival Portend the Future-OrReveal the Structure of the Present?, 113
HARV. L. REv. 110, 145-46 (1999) (suggesting that "the Zobel Court would have done far better to explain
forthrightly that it was treating the state's legal stratification of its citizenry into classes based on.. duration of
residency as constitutionally suspect"); William Cohen, DiscriminationAgainst New State Citizens: An Update,
11 CONST. COMMENT. 73, 78 (1994); Robert C. Farrell, ClassificationsThat DisadvantageNewcomers and the
Problemof Equality, 28 U. RICH L. REv. 547, 561 (1994) (describing Zobel as twisting "the traditional deferential
rationality review into an unrecognizable form"); Roger Craig Green, Note, InterestDefinition in Equal Protection:
A Study of JudicialTechnique, 108 YALE L.J. 439, 471 n.133 (1998); Kathryn D. Katz, More Equal Than Others:
The Burger Court and the Newly Arrived State Resident, 19 N.M. L. REV. 329, 357-59 & 365-67 (1989).
9. The New Mexico Constitution authorizes a property tax exemption for veterans without regard to the
date the veteran acquired state citizenship or regard to service in time of war. See, e.g., N.M CONST., art. VIll, §
5. However, the exemption requires an implementing statute and, as a result, the benefit is limited to those veterans
identified in the authorizing legislation. See Hooper, 101 N.M. at 175, 679 P.2d at 843.
10. The 1923 statute initially passed by the New Mexico legislature simply required residency, see id.
(citing NMSA 1941, § 76-111), but a 1933 amendment to the statute imposed a residency cutoff date-only
veterans obtaining residency prior to January 1934 were eligible for the exemption. See Flaska v. New Mexico, 51
N.M. 13, 19, 177 P.2d 174, 177 (1946) ("By amendment in 1933 [the legislature] provided that the claimant's
residence must be acquired prior to January 1, 1934."). Subsequent versions of the tax exemptions contained
similar restrictions. For veterans of the First World War, the legislature retained the Jan. 1, 1934, date. Veterans
of World War 11were eligible if they were residents prior to Jan. 1, 1947, and Korean War veterans must have been
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For veterans of the Vietnam War, the New Mexico Legislature initially authorized
an exemption for individuals who were residents when they enlisted in the
military." In 1981, the legislature expanded the benefit to include veterans who
were residents prior to May 8, 1975, whether or not they were residents at the time
of enlistment. 2 As had been the case with the residency requirements set for earlier
wars, this date reflected the federal government's definition of the end of the
Vietnam era. 13 The eligibility date was moved back a year in 1983 so that by the
time of Hooper,veterans who were residents before May 8, 1976, were eligible for
the property tax exemption. 4
Alvin Hooper was a Vietnam veteran who was denied the exemption because he
became a New Mexico resident in August 1981, after the statutory deadline. 5 Since
the statute divided veterans into two classes, Hooper sought to invalidate the law
on equal protection grounds. Equal protection analysis requires, as an initial matter,
that courts determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the legislation. If
the distinction discriminates based on a suspect classification or impairs a
fundamental right, courts must apply strict scrutiny and invalidate the statute unless
it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.1 6 If the statute touches
on neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, courts apply rational basis review
and the statute must merely rationally relate to a legitimate state interest.' 7 Hooper
argued in favor of heightened scrutiny on the theory that the New Mexico statute
burdened his constitutional right to travel.' 8
The right to travel has only a limited textual basis in the Constitution 9 but has
a long history in the Supreme Court extending prior to the Civil War. In the 1849
Passenger Cases,2° the Supreme Court struck down state taxes on immigrants
arriving from other states with Chief Justice Taney (in dissent) identifying a
constitutional right to travel: "We are all citizens of the United States; and, as
members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through
residents before Feb. 1, 1955. See Hooper, 472 U.S. at 614 n.1. For both of these conflicts, the dates were set to
track federal law which, for purposes of eligibility for veterans' benefits, set the end of World War n1at Dec. 31,
1946, and the end of the Korean Conflict at Jan. 31, 1955. See 38 U.S.C. § 101 (8)-(9) (2006).
11. See Act of March 30, 1973, ch. 258, 1973 N.M. Laws 1052. The statute originally also required that
the veteran have earned a medal. See Hooper, 472 U.S. at 614 n.2.
12. See Act of April 7, 1981, ch. 187, 1981 N.M. Laws 1078; Hooper, 472 U.S. at 614 n.2.
13. For purposes of eligibility for veterans' benefits, the end of the "Vietnam Era" occurred on May 7, 1975.
See 38 U.S.C. § 101(29) (2006); Hooper, 472 U.S. at 617, n.5.
14. See Act of April 8, 1983, ch. 330, 1983 N.M. Laws 2112.
15. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 101 N.M. 172, 174, 679 P.2d 840, 842 (Ct. App. 1984).
16. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2003); Nordlinger v. Hahn,
505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
17. See, e.g., Nordlinger,505 U.S. at 10; New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Gender-based
classifications receive intermediate scrutiny. They must serve important government interests and be substantially
related to achieve those objectives. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
18. Hooper, 101 N.M. at 174, 679 P.2d at 842.
19. In 1999, the Court held that the right to travel is one of the Privileges and Immunities guaranteed to
citizens of the United States by Section Iof the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I; Saenz
v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999). Before Saenz, some Justices had relied on the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring), while others had found that the right
to travel resided in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 74
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring), or as an adjunct of the Commerce Clause, see Crandall v. Nevada 73 U.S. 35,
48-49 (1867).
20. 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
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every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States."'" The Court
later adopted this language from Chief Justice Taney's dissent in Crandall v.
Nevada22 and United States v. Guest.23 Despite the lack of textual support, these
cases viewed the right as well established.24
In the context of the Equal Protection Clause and durational residence requirements like the one at issue in Hooper, the Court's right-to-travel jurisprudence
begins with Shapiro v. Thompson.25 In Shapiro, the Court invalidated the welfare
laws of several states that denied benefits to residents who had lived in the
jurisdiction less than one year.26 Shapiro is a mixed opinion, using both strict
scrutiny and rational basis review. Section 1I of the opinion applied strict scrutiny,27
while Section II of the opinion concluded that some of the purported interests
justifying the laws failed to meet even a rational basis standard. In Section I1,the
Court indicated that "the specific objective of these provisions" appeared to be
deterring welfare recipients from entering the state in order to seek benefits.2" The
Court rejected this purpose as "constitutionally impermissible" regardless of the
level of scrutiny applied. 29 The states then argued they could provide benefits only
to those who have contributed to the public treasury in the past.3" The Supreme
Court also rejected this justification as constitutionally impermissible but provided
only a slippery slope argument in support:
Appellants' reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from
schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed
it would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the
past tax contributions of its citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such
an apportionment of state services.3'
The Court then applied strict scrutiny to the remainder of the justifications provided
by the states on the theory that the classification in the case "penalize[d] the
exercise of' the fundamental right to travel32 and concluded that none of them

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
73 U.S. 35, 48 (1867).
383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
Guest even viewed the non-textual nature of the right to travel as evidence of its importance.
The constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the highways
and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental
to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly
recognized.
... [Tihat right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been

suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel
throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.
Id. at 757-58.
25. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
26. Id. at621-22.
27. Id. at 638.
28. Id. at 628.
29. Id. at 631.
30. Id. at 632.
31. Id. at 632-33.
32. Id. at 634.
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constituted a compelling governmental interest."3 The Court left open the possibility
that some durational residence requirements might survive, indicating that
restrictions on voting, free education at state schools, and licenses to hunt, fish, or
practice a trade "may promote compelling state interest on the one hand, or, on the
other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate
travel."34
Shapiro, then, sets up two rules. First, residency requirements penalizing the
exercise of the right to travel receive strict scrutiny. Second, some goals, including
discouraging interstate travel and providing benefits based on past tax contributions,
are not permissible under any standard of review. The Court clarified the first rule
in a series of cases following soon after Shapiro.In Dunn v. Blumstein,35 the Court
applied strict scrutiny to strike down a durational residency requirement on the right
to vote, while in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,36 the Court rejected a
statute limiting non-emergency, state-funded medical care to those who had been
residents for at least a year.37 Memorial Hospital reaffirmed that "some waiting
periods may not be penalties," including, for instance, "state statutes requiring one
year of residence as a condition to lower tuition at state institutions of higher
education. 38 However, restrictions on "a fundamental political right," like the right
to vote in Dunn or "the basic necessities of life," like the right to welfare in
Shapiro,orthe right to medical care in MemorialHospital, were penalties subject
to strict scrutiny.39
Along these lines, the Court upheld Iowa's one-year residency requirement to
obtain a divorce in Sosna v. Iowa.4" While the Court did not explicitly indicate the
tier of scrutiny used in Sosna,4' it did not apply the aggressive analysis of strict
scrutiny. The Court concluded that the "residency requirement may reasonably be
justified on grounds other than purely budgetary considerations or administrative

33. Id. at 638.
34. Id. at 638n.21.
35. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Some of the language in Dunn suggests that all durational residency requirements
penalize the right to travel and are analyzed under strict scrutiny. Id. at 342 ("Durational residence laws
impermissibly condition and penalize the right to travel by imposing their prohibitions on only those persons who
have recently exercised that right... .In
sum, durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protection
test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are 'necessary to promote a
compelling government interest."' (quoting Shapiro,394 U.S. at 634)). The Court's opinion in MemorialHospital
v. Maricopa County, though, makes clear that the doctrine is not so broad and only those classifications operating
as a penalty are subject to strict scrutiny. 415 U.S. 250, 258-59 (1973).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 261-62. In the interim, the Supreme Court also decided Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973),
in which it struck down a Connecticut law which presumed that any student who moved to the state in the prior
year was a nonresident for tuition purposes. Rather than apply equal protection analysis, the Court concluded that
such an irrebuttable presumption was a due process violation. Id. at 453-54.
38. Memorial Hospital,415 U.S. at 258-59. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of state durational
residency requirements for in-state tuition against equal protection challenges in a pair of summary affirmances
in the early 1970s. See Sturgis v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057 (1973), affig 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973);
Stains v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), affig 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970).
39. Memorial Hospital,415 U.S. at 259.
40. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
41. Id. at 407. The Court avoided identifying a standard of review by noting that the rule here did not
prevent the new immigrant to the state from obtaining the benefit of divorce, it simply delayed it. Id.
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convenience, ''42 suggesting that the state might be interested in protecting its divorce
decrees from collateral attack, avoiding meddling in disputes in which other states
had a greater interest, or may simply and "quite reasonably decide that it does not
wish to become a divorce mill for unhappy spouses who have lived there as short
a period of time as appellant., 43 Not only are these interests far from the compelling
state interests the Court has recognized in other cases," the Supreme Court has
made clear that when applying strict scrutiny, only the actual justification behind
the state law can qualify as a compelling state interest. 45 The Court's willingness in
Sosna to consider hypothetical interests to justify the law implies that the Court was
engaged in rational basis review. 6
Given this case law at the time of Hooper, the first step for the New Mexico
Court of Appeals in the equal protection analysis was clear. Since strict scrutiny
only applies to residency requirements penalizing the right to travel, i.e., those
implicating a "fundamental political right" or the "basic necessities of life, 47
apportioning veterans' benefits based on the date of arrival in the state was subject
to rational basis review. While the tax benefits in Hooper may be worth more to a
new arrival than in-state tuition, they are certainly less important than the right to
divorce in Sosna, let alone the right to welfare in Shapiro,the right to vote in Dunn,
and the right to medical care in Memorial Hospital. The New Mexico Court of
Appeals reached precisely this conclusion and declined to apply strict scrutiny.48 As
a result, the court held that the distinction drawn in the New Mexico statute only
needed to pass rational basis review-as long as the goal of the statute was
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, it should survive the constitutional
analysis.49
The New Mexico Court of Appeals identified two interests supporting the
statute: "expressing gratitude and rewarding its own citizens for honorable military
service" and "encourag[ing] veterans to settle in New Mexico."5 Hooper argued
that these interests were insufficient to support the classification, relying primarily
on Zobel v. Williams,5 a case decided shortly before Hooper.In Zobel, the Supreme
Court applied rational basis review, as it did in Sosna, to an equal protection
challenge that implicated the right to travel and rejected some classes of rewards to

42.

Id. at 406.

43. Id. at 407.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (identifying diversity in law school student
44. See, e.g.,
body as compelling state interest); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (compelling
state interest in remedying present effects of past discrimination).
45. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,908 n.4 (1996) ("To be acompelling interest, the State must show that
the alleged objective was the legislature's 'actual purpose' for the discriminatory classification.") (citing
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 & n.16 (1982)).
46. Unlike strict scrutiny, the Court has repeatedly made clear that statutes can survive rational basis review
even if there is no evidence that the legitimate state interest supporting the statute actually motivated the legislature.
See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); McDonald
v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
47. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1973) (citations omitted).
48. "[The veteran's exemption] does not unconstitutionally penalize an exercise of the right to travel."
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 101 N.M. 172, 175, 679 P.2d 840, 843 (Ct. App. 1984).
49. Id.

50. Id. at 176, 679 P.2d at 844.
51.

457 U.S. 55 (1982).
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current residents. Zobel, a new arrival to the State of Alaska, challenged the State's
scheme for distributing the proceeds flowing to the State as a result of the discovery
of oil.52 In 1980, the State authorized dividend payments to residents that increased
with the number of years of residency.5 3 As a result, the checks to new arrivals were
smaller than those sent to more established citizens.' The Supreme Court struck
down the scheme on rational basis review.5" Although Alaska suggested that the
apportionment scheme was designed to recognize residents' past contributions to
the State,56 the Court believed that this was identical to the interest rejected in
Shapiro and declared it illegitimate.5 The majority opinion, though, provided no
additional clarity as to why the interest was not legitimate. It simply repeated the
slippery slope argument from Shapiro,arguing that if the dividend benefits can be
apportioned by length of residence, any state benefits or obligations could
discriminate against new arrivals.5"
While Zobel might seem to establish a rule that prior contributions to the state
cannot justify discriminating in the provision of state benefits, the Supreme Court
had historically taken a very different view in the context of veterans' benefits.
States traditionally justify veterans' benefits by claiming that the benefits are a
reward for past military service. "Our country has a long-standing policy of
compensating veterans for their past contributions by providing them with
numerous advantages. This policy has always been deemed to be legitimate."5 9 As
a result, the Supreme Court upheld programs providing benefits to veterans in
employment and education against equal protection challenges on rational basis
review. 6° While Zobel prohibited giving additional benefits solely on the basis of
past contributions to the state, these veterans' benefits casesjustify treating veterans
differently precisely because they have provided prior service to the state.
More significantly, shortly after Shapiro, the Supreme Court approved a
durational residence requirement for veterans' benefits similar to the one at issue
in Hooper. In August v. Bronstein,6' a three-judge panel of the Southern District of
New York considered a challenge to the New York civil service veterans'
preference which provided benefits only to those veterans enlisting from New York.
The court viewed the preference as "a token of gratitude conferred by New York

52. Id. at 57.
53. Id. at 55.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 61. As was also true in Hooper,the Court declined to reach the question of whether strict scrutiny
applied, since the statute was unconstitutional even on a rational basis standard. Id.
56. Id. at 61.
57. Id. at 63.
58. See id. at 64. Specifically, the Court held:
If states can make the amount of a cash dividend depend on length of residence, what would
preclude varying university tuition on a sliding scale based on years of residence-or even
limiting access to finite public facilities, eligibility for student loans, for civil service jobs, or
for government contracts by length of domicile? Could states impose different taxes based on
length of residence?
Id.
59. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (quoting Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-80; Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 381-82 (1974).
61. 369 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), af'd 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
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upon its sons who enter their country's service in time of war, and perhaps an
encouragement to return to the service of the State thereafter."62 The U.S. Supreme
Court summarily affirmed.63
August, then, suggests that states may condition veterans' benefits on the timing
of residency while Zobel held that length of residency was not a permissible
consideration. Given these conflicting precedents, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals had to decide whether Zobel had quietly overruled August and rejected the
long-standing notion that states could provide veterans' benefits in order to reward
past contributions. The court tried to read the cases together by halting the descent
down the slippery slope and drawing a line between generally available benefits and
those provided to a limited group. Because the New Mexico statute "extends a tax
benefit not to all bona fide residents, but to a small class of New Mexico veteran
residents,"' affirming it would not provide a basis for discriminating between new
and old residents when providing benefits more broadly. Since the statute did not
benefit all long-term residents, but simply a narrowly drawn class, it was not a
blanket preference in favor of residents over nonresidents and survived on rational
basis review where the Zobel statute did not.
The Supreme Court, of course, disagreed and struck down the statute.65 The easy
path to rejecting the statute would have been to apply strict scrutiny. Chief Justice
Burger, though, writing for the five-judge majority, followed the Zobel approach
and declined to decide whether strict scrutiny was appropriate, since the Court
believed that the law could not even survive the minimal scrutiny of rational basis
review." The Court rejected both of the reasons provided. First, the Court
concluded that the legislature could not encourage veterans to move to New Mexico
by passing a statute in 1983 that required residence by 1976.67 Second, while the
Court recognized that the state had a legitimate interest in rewarding veterans for
their service, the statute was not rationally related to that goal since it did not
require veterans' military service to coincide with in-state residence. Put another
way, the benefit was not rationally related to the goal of rewarding their service
because veterans could obtain the benefit by moving to the state after leaving the
service.6 8 Since the benefit was disconnected from the veterans' service, the Court
believed that the statute fell within the ShapirolZobel prohibition on rewarding
citizens for their past contributions to the state and was therefore unconstitutional.69
II.
Gerald Gunther coined the famous phrase in 1971 that heightened scrutiny "is
'strict' in theory, fatal in fact" while rational basis review involves "minimal

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 193.
417 U.S. 901 (1974) overruled by Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 101 N.M. 172, 177, 679 P.2d 840, 845 (Ct. App. 1984).
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 622-23 (1985).
Id. at 618.
Id. at 619-20.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 622-23.
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scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."7 Since 1971, Hooper finds itself on
a short list of cases where the Court invalidated a statute on rational basis review.
In fact, the Court engaged in a burst of aggressive rational basis review in the spring
and early summer of 1985. Hooper was decided just two months after the Court's
March 1985 decision invalidating the zoning requirements of a Texas community
discriminating against group homes for individuals with mental retardation in City
of Cleburnev. CleburneLiving Center.7' In that same term the Court handed down
MetropolitanLife InsuranceCo. v. Ward'72 and Williams v. Vermont," both of which
invalidated state statutes discriminating in favor of residents against non-residents
using rational basis review.7 4 Four successful rational basis challenges in one term
was (to say the least) exceptional. In the twenty-five years between the time of
Gunther's article and the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Romer v. Evans,75
the Supreme Court struck down only ten statutes on rational basis challenges.76 Four
of these were handed down between March and June 1985.77
The relative rarity of successful rational basis challenges in the Supreme Court
suggests that something is amiss in Hooper. The logic of the opinion confirms it.
First, Hooper,along with Zobel, deems the state interest of rewarding citizens as not
legitimate. The list of illegitimate state interests in other equal protection claims that
have failed rational basis review is short, and those interests are inauspicious. They
include a "bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group' ' 78 and "an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded.'7 9 Compensating residents for past
contributions to the state may be a candidate for this list, but it is hardly a prime
contender for inclusion. Rewarding past service is far less invidious a motive than
the naked discrimination objectives of the statutes in those cases.
More importantly, the careful consideration in the Hooperand Zobel opinions of
the link between the statutory classifications and goals strongly suggests that the
Court used some form of heightened scrutiny. Both Hooper and Zobel closely
70. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). Gunther's article has been used to mark the start of the modem era of rational basis
scrutiny. See also Goldberg, supranote 3, at 513; Farrell, supra note 3, at 370.
71. 473 U.S. 432, 447-48 (1985).
72. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
73. 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
74. In Metropolitan Life Insurance, the Court struck down an Alabama statute that imposed a lower
premium tax rate on domestic insurance companies than on out-of-state companies. 470 U.S. at 871. In Williams
the Court struck down a Vermont statute which required people who bought and registered vehicles outside of the
state before becoming residents to pay a full use tax in order to register a vehicle in Vermont. 472 U.S. at 15.
75. 517 U.S. 620(1996).
76. See supranote 3.
77. Zobel has a similar companion case. The day after the Court handed down Zobel in June 1982, it struck
down a Texas state statute denying a free public education to undocumented immigrants in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982). Plyler and City of Cleburne are often cited as cases where the Court applied heightened scrutiny in
the guise of rational basis review. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, "There is Only One Equal ProtectionClause":An
Appreciation of Justice Steven's EqualProtection Jurisprudence,74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2301, 2307-08 (2006);
Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: The Cruel and Invidious DiscriminationBehind
Hetrosexist Statutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195,233-35 (2008); Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer
and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes Out of the Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 355,380 (2006); Note,
Making Outcastsof Outlaws: The UnconstitutionalityofSex Offender RegistrationandCriminalAlienDetention,
117 HARV. L. REv. 2731, 2742 (2004).
78. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
79. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,450 (1985).
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analyze the fit between the statutory classification and the stated goal. In general,
the Supreme Court declines to invalidate classifications on rational basis review
even where the class drawn is underinclusive or overinclusive.80 The Supreme Court
has also made clear that classifications need not actually promote the goal of the
statute so long as the legislature "rationally could have believed" the statute would
promote the desired objective."' Zobel and Hooper, though, rejected the allocation
of benefits in those cases in part due to a lack of fit. Zobel, for instance, concluded
that the state had two legitimate interests in its distribution scheme.82 First, Alaska
could legitimately seek to encourage residents to stay in the state, and second,
Alaska might wish to deter risky investments. If current residents were required to
share revenues on a per capita basis with future residents, they might choose to
favor current income over future returns.8 3 The Court rejected both of these goals
as insufficiently related to the classification, because the goals would be equally
well served by operating the dividend scheme prospectively, distributing the funds
evenly among all current residents and only providing reduced benefits to future
new arrivals.84 This "least restrictive means" analysis typically only applies on strict
scrutiny.
Hooper took the same approach and struck down the statute because it was both
under- and over-inclusive. Because the State could better serve the goals of easing
veterans' reintegration into society both by extending the benefit to all resident
veterans, not simply established residents, and by providing a benefit only limited
in time rather than a lifetime property tax exemption, the classification was
irrational.8" Additionally, the Court assumed that states "may legitimately grant
benefits on the basis of a coincidence between military service and past
residence, 8 6 but concluded that the State had drawn the line in the wrong place to
serve that interest because the statute was overinclusive. Chief Justice Burger
believed that the statute would provide benefits to a hypothetical "veteran who
resided in New Mexico as an infant long ago.. .regardless of where he resided
before, during, or after military service." 87 As a result, the statute provided benefits
to those who did not provide their military service to the State. 8 The Court was
almost certainly correct that the classification could have fit the goal more closely,

80. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) ("Even if the classification involved here is to some
extent both underinclusive and overinclusive, and hence the line drawn by Congress is imperfect, it is nevertheless
the rule that in a case like this 'perfection is by no means required."' (quoting Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas
School District, 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960)); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47,57 (1977) ("Congress could reasonably
take one firm step toward [its] goal.. .without accomplishing its entire objective in the same piece of legislation.").
81. W. and S. Life Ins. Co., v. Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 672 (1981) (emphasis omitted).
82. 457 U.S. 55, 62 (1982).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 621 (1985).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 622.
88. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, there is no reason to believe that the majority is correct in its claim
about the hypothesized infant returning to the state. Id. at 631-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Hooper raised this
objection in the New Mexico Court of Appeals and the court refused to reach the question on the grounds that
Hooper lacked standing to raise it. Hooper v. Bemalillo County Assessor, 101 N.M. 172, 177, 679 P.2d 840, 845
(Ct. App. 1984).
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but this analysis is far from the generous reading usually applied on rational basis
review.
How did the Court end up applying this heightened scrutiny? In both Hooperand
Zobel, the majority opinion applied rational basis review, but Justices who believed
that the state statute implicated the right to travel cast deciding votes in both cases.
In Zobel, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell,
concluded that the right to travel provided a separate basis for striking down the
Alaska statute. 89 Justice O'Connor concurred in judgment in Zobel and explicitly
grounded her analysis in a right to travel found in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV.9°In Hooper, Justice Brennan was the fifth vote in the majority
and concurred, referencing his opinion in Zobel.9'
The face of the opinion in Zobel understates the Court's desire to invoke a right
to travel. Justice Blackmun's papers contain the first draft of the Chief Justice's
opinion in Zobel v. Williams and it is substantially different from the Court's
eventual opinion. This draft would have created a new constitutional rule that "an
American citizen entering a State and establishing bonafide residence therein can
be accorded no less rights or lesser treatment than those who preceded" and
grounded this rule in the right to travel. 92 The draft opinion reviews the history of
the right-to-travel cases from The Passenger Cases93 through Edwards v.
California94 up to Shapiro v. Thompson95 and Sosna v. Iowa,96 discussing the
Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clauses as potential sources
of the right to travel. 97 The draft finds all of these clauses insufficient and concludes
that the right to travel "has both a more fundamental yet a less explicit source than
any of those sources discussed above. 9 8 The draft holds that the right to migrate
and take up residence in a new state "has much in common with the right of new
States to join the union on an equal footing with the older States." 99 While there is
no textual statement that newly admitted states enter the Union on an equal footing
with older states, the draft reflects the belief that it is "inherent in the very idea of
' ° The Chief Justice then explicitly compares the
statehood in a federal union. '""
rights of new states to the rights of new citizens:
89. 457 U.S. 55, 66 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the right to travel gives "an independent
rationale for holding [the distribution scheme] unconstitutional"). Justice Brennan did not find explicit textual
support for the right to travel, but looked instead to the inherent structure of the Constitution. Id. at 67. ("1
find its
unmistakable essence in that document that transformed a loose confederation of States into one Nation."). See also
Tribe, supra note 8, at 146-47.
90. 457 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91. See Hooper, 472 U.S. at 624 (Brennan, J., concurring). Only eight justices voted as a result of Justice
Powell's recusal, and had Justice Brennan joined the dissent, the Court would have been equally divided and
affirmed the New Mexico Court of Appeals. See id.
92. See First Draft of Zobel v. Williams Majority Opinion, at 9 (Dec. 14, 1981) (unpublished opinion, on
file at Box 346, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter Zobel Draft Opinion].
93. 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
94. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
95. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
96. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
97. See Zobel Draft Opinion, supra note 92, at 4-7.
98. Id at 8.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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We see, thus, that it is firmly settled, although nowhere mentioned in the
Constitution, that a new State coming into the Union has no more, no less and
no different rights than States of longer membership in the Union. Is it not
similarly inherent in the very concept of state or federal citizenship that once
citizenship is attained, the citizen stands on the same or equal footing with all
other citizens?''
The draft finally analyzes the distribution scheme using the language of strict
scrutiny, concluding that "the State must show that the distinctions it seeks to make
are warranted by the highest and most pressing of state interests" and that the states'
interests "are simply not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the infringement of the
fundamental individual rights of those bonafide citizens who settled in the State
after 1959."'"
The Chief Justice's opinion was not popular among his colleagues on the Court,
especially the notion of grounding the right to travel on an "equal footing" theory.'0 3
In a memorandum to the conference, the Chief Justice expressed the view that "both
Equal Protection and the right to travel aspects of Shapiro and other cases bear to
some extent on this case, but it fits neatly into neither category" and agreed to
rewrite the opinion on an equal protection theory."° Significantly, though, the
analysis in Zobel with respect to the prior-contributions justification hardly changed
from the initial, strict scrutiny version to the final, rational basis analysis. Both
opinions rejected the prior-contribution justification for the classification on the
same slippery slope theory that permitting the Alaska scheme would allow states to
distribute any benefits and burden on the basis of the length of residence.'0 5 The
Court simply repurposed the logic that originally supported striking down the
State's interest on a strict scrutiny standard, applied it on rational basis review, and
reached the same conclusion.
The shift in analysis in Zobel, Hooper, and other contemporaneous successful
rational basis challenges received immediate attention (and criticism) in both the
academic literature and in the courts."° Less than a year after Hooper, a plurality
of the Court revisited Hooperand came close to reinterpreting it explicitly as a strict
scrutiny case. Hooper left open the question of whether states could limit

101. Id. The Chief Justice would then have reinterpreted durational residence requirements cases, including
Sosna and Vlandis, as cases establishing criteria for determining bona fide residence. Id. at 9.
102. Id. at 11, 12.
103. Justice Rehnquist worded his response most sharply: "With the wide ranging discussion of sources of
implicit and fundamental Constitutional rights which are nowhere mentioned in the Constitution which are
contained in part I and I of your proposed opinion in this case, you will soon have no one but yourself to blame
for this Court's docket-congestion." Memorandum from Justice William H. Rehnquist (Dec. 15, 1981) (on file at
Box 346, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
104. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger (Dec. 18, 1981) (on file at Box 346, Harry A. Blackmun
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
105. See Zobel Draft Opinion, supra note 92, at 11-12; Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982).
106. See, e.g., Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516,521 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo,
666 F. Supp. 370, 417 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), vacated in part, 888 F.2d 230 (2nd Cir. 1989); William Cohen, Equal
Treatmentfor Newcomers: The Core Meaning of National and State Citizenship, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 14
(1984); Melanie E. Myers, Note, Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Protection Clause, 86 COLUM. L REV.
1184, 1188-89 (1986); Brenda Swierenga, Comment, Still Newer Equal Protection: Impermissible Purpose
Review in the 1984 Term, 53 U. CHI. L REV. 1454, 1468 (1986).
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preferences to those veterans who were residents at the time of enlistment. °7
Attorney Generalof the State ofNew York v. Soto-Lopez10 8 presented the Court with
precisely this question. New York provided a civil service preference for veterans
who entered the service as state residents."° The three-justice plurality opinion
authored by Justice Brennan applied strict scrutiny in striking down the preference
and used Zobel and Hooperas examples of opinions where the Court had previously
applied strict scrutiny."' The plurality compared Zobel and Hooper to Memorial
Hospital,Shapiro,and Dunn and identified all five cases as ones in which "we have
held that even temporary deprivations of very important benefits and rights can
operate to penalize migration.""' The plurality noted that Zobel and Hooper
purported to apply rational basis review in striking down the statutes in those cases
but "[n]onetheless, the conclusion that they did penalize migration may be inferred
from our determination that 'the Constitution will not tolerate a state benefit
between... classes of concededly
distinctions ...
program that creates fixed
12 permanent

bona fide residents.""
The state in Soto-Lopez offered four justifications for the benefit: (1)
encouraging residents to enlist, (2) compensating veteran residents, (3) encouraging
residents to return to the state, and (4) increasing veteran employment in
government. 13 Since these goals could be met equally well by extending the benefit
to all resident veterans, once strict scrutiny applies, the decision to strike down the
statute was clear. 1 4 Strict scrutiny requires the classification to fit the goal as
closely as possible, and the New York statute failed to meet that standard.
Applied to Hooperand Zobel, the plurality's reasoning certainly would have led
to strict scrutiny in those cases. Soto-Lopez identified two features of the veterans'
preference making it significant enough to apply strict scrutiny: it could determine
eligibility for civil service employment, and the benefit was permanent. "' Both of
these features were present in both Zobel and Hooper.The dollar value of both the
Alaska and New Mexico benefits were considerable, and both were permanent.
New arrivals, regardless of how long they stayed in the state, could1 6never achieve
the same level of benefits available to more established residents.'
Since Soto-Lopez, the right-to-travel doctrine has found its constitutional
moorings. In Saenz v. Roe,' the Court faced a challenge to a California welfare
provision limiting new immigrants to the benefits they would have received in their
state of origin for their first year in California." ' Saenz identified three components

107. 472 U.S. 612, 622 n.lI (1985).
108. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
109. Id. at 900.
110. Id. at904-05.
111. Id. at907.
112. Id. at 908 (quoting Hooper, 472 U.S. at 623) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
113. Id. at 909.
114. Id. at910.
115. Id.
116. Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Soto-Lopez argued in favor of continuing the modified
version of rational basis scrutiny applied in Hooper and Zobel, again arguing that the fit between the goals of the
statute and the classification was inadequate. Id. at 913-14 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
117. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
118. Id. at493.
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of the right to travel: (1) "the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave
another State"; (2) "the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an
unfriendly alien"; and (3) for those who decide to change their residence to another
State, "the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.""' 9 The Court found
the latter two rights, respectively, to be rooted in the two Privileges and Immunities
Clauses of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment respectively. 2 0 The California
welfare provision ran afoul of the third right. The Court explicitly expanded the
strict scrutiny analysis of Shapiroto all provisions dividing state citizens based on
their length of residence."'2 "[S]ince the right to travel embraces the citizen's right
to be treated equally in her new State of residence, the discriminatory classification
is itself a penalty" 122 and the Court no longer needed to determine whether the
statute implicated a fundamental political right or affected the basic necessities of
life.
Once the classification was deemed inherently impermissible, the Court's
conclusion that the California provision was unconstitutional was straightforward.
Under the logic of Saenz-Hooper and Zobel are also easy cases. If the right to
travel categorically prohibits distinctions based on length of citizenship, provisions
providing more established residents greater benefits cannot survive. The new
constitutional rule has much in common with Chief Justice Burger's original
proposal in his draft opinion in Zobel. Even though the Saenz majority rested on the
Privileges and Immunities Clause while the Chief Justice relied on the far more
tenuous analogy of new states entering the union on an "equal footing" with the
original thirteen colonies, the end result of the analysis is the same. Both apply strict
scrutiny when states refuse to treat new arrivals as equal citizens.
III.
After Soto-Lopez and Saenz, what does Hooper now stand for? Not much. The
Saenz dissent identified Hooper, along with Zobel, as the target of the Saenz
majority and concluded that the majority opinion cleared "much of the underbrush
created by these prior right-to-travel cases."' 23 Since this reference in the Saenz
dissent about ten years ago, the Supreme Court's only other citation of Hooper
suggests that the Court realizes that it applied strict scrutiny. 124 Zobel has suffered

119.

Id. at 500.

120. Id. at 501, 502-03.
121.

Id. at 504 ("Neither mere rationality nor some intermediate standard of review should be used to judge

the constitutionality of a state rule that discriminates against some of its citizens because they have been domiciled
in the State for less than a year. The appropriate standard may be more categorical than that articulated in Shapiro,
but it is surely no less strict.").
122. Id. at 505. Saenz does leave open the possibility that durational residency requirements may be

acceptable in order to determine whether the new arrival is a bona fide resident. Id.
123. Id. at 515 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
124. WESTLAW search for "472 U.S. 612" and DA(AFF 5/17/1999) in SCT database performed Dec. 6,
2008. In 2003, the Court used Hooper and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. as comparatives when declining to apply

heightened scrutiny:
We here consider whether a difference in state tax rates violates the [Equal Protection Clause].
The law in question does not distinguish on the basis of, for example, race or gender. See, e.g.,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). It does
not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state businesses. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
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a similar fate. The Supreme Court has not cited Zobel since Saenz.12 5 Lower courts
12 6
have also largely abandoned Zobel and Hooper since Saenz was handed down.
So given this history, could the New Mexico Court of Appeals have avoided
reversal in Hooper? The court would have needed to decide that the Supreme Court
in Zobel had taken two very surprising steps. First, they would have had to conclude
27
that Zobel overruled the Supreme Court's own decision in August v. Bronstein
without comment. Second, and more important, they would have had to conclude
that the Supreme Court in Zobel was silently moving from rational basis review to
strict scrutiny in the right-to-travel cases. Such an opinion would have been a very
aggressive act of judicial interpretation.
That approach would have been very much outside my mother's judicial
temperament. I was always proud of my mother as a judge. Closely reading her
Hooper opinion made me prouder still. In the New Mexico Court of Appeals
opinion, I can see her struggle to reconcile Zobel with the rest of the Supreme
Court's right-to-travel doctrine. Indeed, I think she viewed the reconciliation of
apparently conflicting cases as a core judicial task. My sense is that she believed
that the law is knowable and that courts should be taken at their word. I cannot
imagine her writing the decision in Hooper that would have avoided reversal,
because she would have had to suggest that the Supreme Court said one thing in
Zobel but meant something entirely different. I think she would have viewed it as
the Supreme Court's job to make the transition in the doctrine and not hers. As a
result, while she was reversed in Hooper,I do not think she was wrong.

v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). Neither does it favor a State's long-time residents at the expense
of residents who have more recently arrived from other States. Cf. Hooper v. Bemalillo County
Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985). Rather, the law distinguishes for tax purposes among revenues
obtained within the State of Iowa by two enterprises, each of which does business in the State.
Where that is so, the law is subject to rational-basis review.
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
125. WESTLAW search for "457 U.S. 55" and DA(AFr 5/17/1999) in SCT database performed Dec. 6,
2008.
126. After Saenz, Hooperhas only been cited by fourteen federal court cases and fourteen state court cases.
WESTLAW search for "472 U.S. 612" and DA(AFT 5/17/1999) in ALLCASES database performed Dec. 6, 2008.
Forty-one federal and seventeen state cases have relied on Zobel. WESTLAW search for "457 U.S. 55" and
DA(AFT 5/17/1999) in ALLCASES database performed Dec. 6, 2008. Compare these citation rates to those for
Plylerand Cleburne,cases decided at exactly the same time and also applying heightened scrutiny in the guise of
rational basis review. Since Saenz, Plyler has been cited in 561 federal cases, including four Supreme Court
opinions, and 135 state cases-over ten times the number of citations to Zobel. WESTLAW search for "457 U.S.
202" and DA(AFT 5/17/1999) in ALLCASES database performed Dec. 6,2008. Since Saenz, Cleburne has been
cited in 315 states cases and 2082 federal cases, including thirteen in the Supreme Court--over eighty times as
often as Hooper. WESTLAW search for "473 U.S. 432" and DA(AFT 5/17/1999) in ALLCASES database
performed Dec. 6, 2008.
127. 369 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd417 U.S. 901 (1974). The Second Circuit, in the opinion later
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Soto-Lopez, came to precisely this conclusion. 755 F.2d 266, 272-75 (2nd
Cir. 1985).

